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I. INTRODUCTION
Intercircuit inconsistency, that is, doctrinal conflict between
the United States Courts of Appeals has, it is alleged, been on the
rise in recent years. Claims have been made that the Supreme Court
is not adequately resolving such conflict, despite the Court's state-
ment in its Rule 19 that intercircuit conflict is one basis for the
* Financial assistance for the research reported here came from the Office of Research
and Projects, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, and from the Penrose Fund of the
American Philosophical Society. Office space during my stay in San Francisco was graciously
provided by Hastings College of Law through the "good offices" of Dean Marvin Anderson. I
wish particularly to thank Dorothy Robyn, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of
California, Berkeley, and Professor Thomas Kerr, Hastings College of Law, for assistance in
developing the questionnaire; and Susan Hickman and Michael Wepsiec for tabulation of
data gathered by Becky Colford Murphy, Don Frazier, and John Rink. My deepest apprecia-
tion is extended to the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
who tolerated extensive questioning from a social scientist and "court-watcher."
Discussion of inconsistency as a problem, of the areas of the law in which inconsistency
more frequently occurs, and of its causes, is based in part on the formulation by Michael
Wepsiec, Ninth Circuit Border Searches: Doctrines and Inconsistency (May 1978) (Honors
Thesis, Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale), for
which the author was faculty adviser. Wepsiec drew on material abstracted from the author's
Ninth Circuit interviews. I am much indebted to Mr. Wepsiec for use of material from his
manuscript and for his permission to do so.
** Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany. A.B., Antioch
College, 1959; M.A., 1961, Ph.D., 1962, University of Oregon.
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granting of certiorari. After investigating the problem, the Commis-
sion on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (the Hruska
Commission) recommended the establishment of a National Court
of Appeals to increase the federal courts' capacity to provide consis-
tent doctrine at the national level.'
A more serious problem, at least for lawyers and district court
judges, is doctrinal conflict within a circuit, that is, intracircuit
inconsistency. It is a problem because lawyers advising their clients
have difficulty deciding which precedents to follow and district
court judges are unsure what rules to apply in the cases they must
decide. This Article provides an examination of intracircuit incon-
sistency in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth, which is the second-largest federal appellate court in
terms of the number of active judgeships, is studied from the
perspective of the court's judges.2 Allegations have been made that
intracircuit inconsistency is a particular problem in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, because of that court's large number of active-duty judges and
its use of more "extra" judges-senior circuit judges, district judges,
and visiting judges from outside the circuit 3 -than any other circuit.
Because intracircuit inconsistency is not unique to the Ninth Cir-
cuit and appears to exist in all circuits, the picture presented here
is of general interest. Although the United States Courts of Appeals
vary in size (both geographically and in terms of the number of
judges) and in workload, all face the problem of intracircuit incon-
sistency, and are even more likely to have to contend with it as a
result of the judgeships added by the Omnibus Judgeship Bill of
1978.1
1. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 30-32, 37-44 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES].
2. At the time of the study upon which this Article was based, the Circuit with the most
active judgeships was the Fifth with fifteen. The Ninth Circuit, with thirteen, was followed
by the District of Columbia, Second, Third and Sixth Circuits, with nine each; the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits, with eight each; the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, with seven each; and
the First Circuit, with three. 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1976). Including new judgeships to be added
pursuant to the Omnibus Judgeship Bill of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (Oct. 20,
1978) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), the Fifth Circuit remains the largest circuit
in terms of active judgeships, with twenty-six, and the remainder of the circuits will have
the following number of judgeships: Ninth Circuit, twenty-three; District of Columbia, Sec-
ond, and Sixth Circuits, eleven; Third and Fourth Circuits, ten; Seventh and Eighth Circuits,
nine; Tenth Circuit, eight; and First Circuit, four.
3. See Wasby, "Extra" Judges in "The Court Nobody Knows:" Some Aspects of
Decision-Making in the United States Courts of Appeals, (September, 1979) (paper presented
to the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (Oct. 20, 1978) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). Section 3(b) of the Act created thirty-five additional judgeships in the courts of
appeals.
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This Article is based on an extensive study of the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits that focused
on two interrelated questions. The first question was how judges in
geographically large circuits communicate with each other when
they are not all stationed in the same city.' The focus of this Article
is on the second question-the problem of intracircuit inconsis-
tency. The study is based on largely open-ended interviews with the
Ninth Circuit's active-duty and senior circuit judges and with some
active-duty and senior district judges who had sat most frequently
with the court of appeals over the period between 1971 and the
interviews, which were conducted in 1977.6 It is part of an effort by
students of the judicial process, who have concentrated their work
on the Supreme Court of the United States, to pay more attention
to the lower federal courts. It is thus an addition to the work of
Schick,7 Howard,' Richardson and Vines,' Goldman,'" and Atkins
and Green," and should help make better known what one circuit
judge calls "The Court Nobody Knows."" In examining the courts,
it is important to understand judicial decision making as viewed by
its direct participants. Their explanations may, of course, be ration-
5. See Wasby, Communication Within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: The View
from the Bench, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1 (1977).
6. Fifteen Ninth Circuit appellate judges were interviewed-all but one of the eleven
active-duty judges then serving (there were two vacancies, since filled)-as well as five of the
seven judges on senior status. Ten district court judges, from California and Oregon, were
also interviewed. The interviews ran from one hour to two hours. Because of some time
pressures, not all judges answered all the questions.
7. See M. SCHICK, LEARNED HANDS mrCOU (1970). Schick's work is the only book-length
study of a United States Court of Appeals.
8. See Howard, Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts of Appeals, 39 J.
POL. 916 (1977); Howard, Litigation Flow in Three United States Courts of Appeals, 8 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Litigation Flow]; Howard & Goldman, The
Variety of Litigant Demand in Three United States Courts of Appeals, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
223 (1978).
9. See R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE PoLTrrIcs OF FEDERAL COURTs (1970).
10. See Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964,
60 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 374 (1966); Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1965-
1971: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 635 (1973); Goldman, Conflict and Consen-
sus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 461.
11. See Atkins, Decision-Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United States
Courts of Appeals, 25 W. POL. Q. 626 (1972); Atkins & Green, Consensus on the United States
Court of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20 Am. J. POL. Sci. 735 (1976); Atkins & Zavoina,
Judicial Leadership on the Court of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in
Race Relations Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. J. POL. Sci. 701 (1974); Green & Atkins,
Designated Judges: How Well Do They Perform?, 61 JuD. 358 (1978).
12. See also Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Haworth,
Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.
L.Q. 257.
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alizations. However, because they are in "the crucible of experi-
ence," studies of how they view the world in which they operate
remain significant, and can assist in the development of explana-
tions of judicial behavior. Since the United States Courts of Appeals
are the "final resting place" for upwards of ninety-five percent of
all federal cases, either because they are not appealed or because the
Supreme Court denies review, aspects of the decision making pro-
cesses of those courts are surely worthy of study.
II. EXISTENCE OF INCONSISTENCY
Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold has been the individ-
ual who has focused most explicitly on intracircuit inconsistency in
the Ninth Circuit. In a 1972 lecture, he commented on the "diversity
of decision" within the courts of appeals, using the Ninth Circuit
as an example of a court in which the fact that a question had
already been decided by the court "makes no difference" because
another panel "may take a different view of the problem."" In his
1973 Hruska Commission testimony, it was clear that he was not
using the Ninth Circuit simply as an example. He had "formed the
impression," he said, "that in the Ninth Circuit very little attention
was paid to the question of intracircuit conflicts," because the
judges "endeavored to do justice in the case as they thought it
appeared to them." One could find, he claimed, "another panel ten
days later deciding essentially the same question the other way
without any reference to the first case."' 5 He-and others in the
Department of Justice, he asserted-felt that the Ninth Circuit
judges "regarded it less a matter with which they should be con-
cerned as to whether they were consistent with other panels even
after it was quite specifically pointed out to them.""
While Dean Griswold was the primary proponent of the argu-
ment that there was considerable intracircuit inconsistency in the
Ninth Circuit, he was not the only person to mention the subject
before the Hruska Commission. Judge Robert Schnake of the North-
ern District of California mentioned having been faced with "two
rather recent Ninth Circuit opinions, one going one way and one
13. See Litigation Flow, supra note 8, at 41-44.
14. Address by Erwin N. Griswold, 29th Annual Cardozo Lecture, Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (November 21, 1972), reprinted in CoMMIssION ON REviSION OF
THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, FIRST PHASE HEARING: AUGUST-OCTOBER, 1973, at 468
[hereinafter cited as FIRST PHASE].
15. FIRST PHASE, supra note 14, at 10. Griswold tried to file petitions for rehearing en
banc, but "learned rather quickly that ordinarily those petitions were denied." Id.
16. Id. at 28.
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conceivably going another . . .," but he noted this occurred only
rarely." Two practicing lawyers also commented on the subject. G.
William Shea, President of the Los Angeles County Bar Association,
while not using the word "inconsistency," did mention a "great
variance in the panels and their approach to problems" in the anti-
trust area, leading to "quite a divergence." He added that "even
Judge Ely, in his most recent opinion . . . makes reference to this
disparity of view in his own circuit."" Attorney Marcus Mattson,
also of Los Angeles, asked by a Commission member specifically
about intracircuit conflicts in the civil area, said that there were no
such cases he could cite, and added his opinion that the Ninth
Circuit had done "pretty well" in that respect. He did, however,
suggest that "the panel will have some effect on the outcome of a
case," adding, "[tihat is not all bad. It is bad but not all bad.""
One other statement about the Ninth Circuit's inconsistency
deserves mention here, because of where it was published-the
American Bar Association Journal-and the attention it received in
the circuit. James N. Gardner, a former Ninth Circuit law clerk,
wrote an article claiming that the court of appeals used its "Not for
Publication" cases to hide intracircuit inconsistency.'" Apart from
the issue of the propriety of unpublished opinions, it was clear that
he felt the court was inconsistent in the area of law on which he
focused (border searches): "Not only is the Ninth Circuit inconsis-
tent in deciding what facts are sufficient to constitute a founded
suspicion [necessary for a "stop"], its various panels cannot even
agree on the threshold issue of what standard of review to apply to
a trial court's founded suspicion determination." Both Gardner's
article and Dean Griswold's comments were referred to by the
judges in the interviews for this Article.
The Ninth Circuit judges interviewed were asked about judges'
and lawyers' perceptions of the existence of inconsistency, as well
as their own views as to whether inconsistency occurred and the
extent to which it was a problem. Fourteen of fifteen circuit judges
said that district judges and lawyers in the circuit feel there is
inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit's decisions. One remarked that
17. Id. at 885.
18. Id. at 953.
19. Id. at 965.
20. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61
A.B.A.J. 1224 (1975).
21. Id. at 1226.
22. The remaining judge, who answered that he did not know, said that the district
judges in his state might kid him about "What did you [circuit judges] do?" but neither
they nor the lawyers had complained, nor had he asked about the matter.
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the "lawyer thinks that right after losing a case," while another said
that there is inconsistency in any court's decisions, a reflection of
how one reads a case.
District court judges may well have difficulty trying to ascer-
tain the "law of the circuit" or "circuit precedent." Judge Ben Dun-
iway, testifying before the Hruska Commission, said that he had
heard district judges complain that they didn't know what the law
of the circuit was on a question. He added that in some cases those
judges were "quite right."2 3 In the interviews, the circuit judges who
had been district judges were asked whether, as district judges, they
had perceived any inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit's decisions.
Two had and two had not. Yet three of the four had experienced
difficulty in trying to determine the "law of the circuit" applicable
to their cases. One judge who had not perceived inconsistency felt
he had been able to reconcile the decisions in his own mind, but he
noted that he differed from some district judge colleagues with
whom he used to "kick around" the subject. Moreover, he conceded
that there was "difficulty in trying to understand what a panel
said."2 At least for him, difficulty in determining the "law of the
circuit" differed from "inconsistency" in the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sions.
Only four current district judges indicated whether they had
difficulty in trying to determine the "law of the circuit." Again, two
did and two did not. It happened "not frequently [but] occasion-
ally," said one, while another said the same problem existed con-
cerning the United States Supreme Court's decisions. One judge
claimed ability to eliminate any difficulty in determining what law
to apply because "I can distinguish [a case] if I want to." Another
district judge who complained that it was "very difficult to know
what the state of the law is" was clearly directing his ire principally
at the Supreme Court, not at the Ninth Circuit. He argued that
some Supreme Court opinions were "so long and have so many notes
and concurring and dissenting opinions" that you "have to take a
week off to understand what they had in mind." Although he per-
ceived "a general thread of consistency" in the Ninth Circuit's rul-
ings, this judge thought that inconsistency was bound to happen
Material which appears in quotation marks without attribution is drawn from the tran-
scripts of the interviews conducted by the author. To protect the anonymity of Judge Shirley
Hufstedler, then the Ninth Circuit's only female circuit judge, the male pronoun is used
throughout.
23. FmsT PHASE, supra note 14, at 897.
24. Three cases, he noted, might make it easier to determine the law of the circuit than
would one, because the cases taken together "would indicate an approach, which could then
be applied." See also id. at 492 (remarks of Judge C. Clyde Atkins).
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when a court turns out as many opinions as that court does.
When the judges were asked more directly about Ninth Circuit
internal inconsistency, there was virtual unanimity that it existed:
thirteen of fifteen circuit judges and all eleven district judges re-
sponding said so. Two former district judges qualified their respon-
ses: inconsistency occurred only "to a limited degree" and "in a
limited sense." A colleague, who remarked that the only inconsis-
tencies were inadvertent and "ones we've overlooked," called atten-
tion to the court's rule that one panel is not to overrule another
panel. That rule, which the judge said meant that no inconsistency
was intentional, had been discussed with the Hruska Commission
when Commission member Congressman Charles Wiggins had
asked Judge John Kilkenny whether there was a Ninth Circuit rule
"that the members of the panel are bound by other decisions of the
Ninth Circuit." Answered the judge, "Yes, an absolute rule. And it
is seldom, it is seldom that we get in a position where we do have
these intracircuit conflicts on account of that rule."25 Judge Alvin
Rubin, now of the Fifth Circuit, discussing a similar rule, said that
"once a panel of a circuit formulates a rule of decision in one case,
the other judges of the circuit are bound to follow that precedent,
right or wrong, in future cases, at least until it is reconsidered by
the entire court sitting en banc."2 8
Another Ninth Circuit judge, in more extended remarks,
argued that it was "hard to find a situation where one [panel] says
A is law and another says B is law." Those, he said, were corrected.
What did "drive people up the wall" were problems "in applying a
given body of law to the facts," where "people look at situations in
different ways." 27 This judge also argued, in comments relevant to
25. Id. at 818. Schick notes that during Judge Learned Hand's tenure as the Second
Circuit's Chief Judge, that court's "tradition [was] to adhere to previous panel decisions,
especially those that [were] recent. There have been innumerable instances where judges
have declined to dissent because 'the law of the Circuit has apparently been determined to
the contrary, and so I shall join in my brothers' disposition."' SCHICK, supra note 7, at 114.
While there were "no hard and fast rules requiring intermediate appellate judges to abide by
long-standing precedents of their own court . .. or rulings by other panels within the circuit,"
nonetheless the Second Circuit's members "generally tend[ed] to follow precedent and
previous panels." Because of the court's refusal at that time to hear cases en banc, "the judges
at times were squarely faced with the question of whether to adhere to earlier decisions that
they disagreed with." Id. at 319. Schick notes an instance when a Second Circuit panel
followed a previous ruling of the court, decided by a 2-1 vote, although all three judges agreed
with the minority opinion in the earlier case. Dickinson v. Mulligan, 173 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.
1949), reversed sub nom. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950); Id.
at 115. For a discussion of en banc sittings of the Ninth Circuit as a mechanism to resolve
conflict, see notes 68-69 infra and accompanying text.
26. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 448, 452 (1976). Judge
Rubin was with the Eastern District of Louisiana at the time of the Hearings.
27. Although the Hruska Commission's concern was inter- rather than intracircuit in-
1979]1 1349
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the question of inconsistency, that because judging was a "lonely
business" with the court coming to its rulings through "very private
decisions," from which "appearance will emerge," he didn't care
"how we appear as a result."
One of the two circuit judges who felt there was no inconsis-
tency in the court's rulings warned against confusing inconsistency
with development of the law in a new area, where the court was
more willing to upset findings of fact. "The law develops that way,"
he said. The court "will be able to look back and see what the law
is." In another conversation, discussing antitrust law, the judge said
that one of the Ninth Circuit's basic standards had been modified
and shifted, "but that's the name of the game" in a developing area
of law."s The other judge argued that there was less inconsistency
in the Ninth Circuit's decisions than one could find in conflicting
lines of authority in the Supreme Court's decisions, but he warned
that some inconsistency might develop once the court had twenty-
three judges. This judge placed the burden of discovering inconsis-
tency on the attorneys rather than the court." He also specifically
addressed Griswold's claims about the Ninth Circuit." He and other
members of the court had confronted Griswold, who, he claimed,
had not produced "more than several Selective Service cases, at a
time when the Ninth Circuit was handing down six a day."3' Con-
consistency, its studies are important. The law professors who undertook an examination of
inconsistency at the Commission's behest found "direct conflicts," "strong partial conflicts,"
and "weak partial conflicts." Concluded the Commission:
Often the conflicts are direct and frontal, arising because two or more courts have come
to opposite conclusions in cases which cannot be distinguished. Less direct conflicts,
however, can also produce uncertainty and confusion in the national law. . . . Such
divergences have also been termed "sideswipes," and it is clear that there are many more
of them than direct conflicts.
STRucTuRE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURs, supra note 1, at 16. The two Commission studies can
be found in the appendix of the Commission report. See Illustrative Cases: Conflicts, Uncer-
tainty, and Relitigation, in id. at 76-90; Conflicts and the Supreme Court: A Study of
Petitions for Certiorari, in id. at 19-110.
28. The standard was that of Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), on attempts to monopolize. See Barnum, Antitrust, Ninth
Circuit Survey: 1974-1975 Term, 6 GoLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 365, 365-66, 385-87 (1976).
29. Hruska Commission consultant Professor Floyd Feeney noted that "the judgment
as to whether a conflict exists or not is often quite a difficult one" and that "there is a natural
tendency on the part of attorneys to assert any point that can be claimed as a conflict."
STRucTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDUREs, supra note 1, at 97. Professor Feeney's work is included
in Conflicts and the Supreme Court: A Study of Petitions for Certiorari, in id. at 91-110.
30. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
31. In the Hruska Commission hearings, Assistant U.S. Attorney Lawrence W. Camp-
bell of Los Angeles testified that three Selective Service cases prosecuted by his office,
involving identical facts, resulted in inconsistent decisions. Two Ninth Circuit panels decided
in favor of the government "on a particular issue that was deemed dispositive of the appeals,"
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ceding that cases on probable cause or founded suspicion3 2 ap-
proached being inconsistent, he asserted that the court would take
cases en banc where conflict appeared. He had also researched the
cases cited in Gardner's article" and found no conflicts. He did,
however, volunteer the comment that "the panel you draw will
make a difference in close cases."
The district judges had had direct experience with the Ninth
Circuit's inconsistency. When one had decided several environmen-
tal cases with common issues, he had been reversed on one of the
issues, with another Ninth Circuit panel going the other way the
same day. The Ninth Circuit took the cases en banc, however, and
resolved the inconsistency. Other district judges noted that case
results may differ depending on the panel which hears them. The
law thus "moves slowly in jerks and starts." One of these judges
noted some inconsistency between published and unpublished opin-
ions, adding that the circuit judges had "some temptation" to reach
contrary results in nonpublished cases.
III. VARIATION IN INCONSISTENCY
Almost all judges agreed that inconsistency occurs more fre-
quently in some areas of the law than in others. Only one circuit
judge and two district judges did not believe that this was the case.
The other two district judges said they did not know, but one com-
mented it was more likely in "borderline factual" situations. Cir-
cuits vary as to the subjects where intracircuit inconsistency ap-
pears most frequently, but circuit and district judges alike generally
agreed that in the Ninth Circuit it occurred disproportionately in
criminal law cases with "constitutional rights aspects.""3 Particu-
larly significant was the search and seizure area, specifically border
searches involving the "probable cause" and "founded suspicion"
necessary before a stop can be made.35 Also likely to produce incon-
sistency in the criminal law were gun cases, because, like stops and
searches, they involved "minute fact situations." Habeas corpus
cases and those involving post-conviction remedies" were also
while the third panel, "in a much longer opinion chose to go the other way," despite a dissent
which pointed out the inconsistency. FmsT PHASE, supra note 14, at 956-57.
32. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
34. One judge commented acerbically, "nor has the Supreme Court helped us out
much," and a colleague observed that inconsistency "exists in only a few areas, primarily
where the Supreme Court has failed to create a definite rule we could follow."
35. E.g., Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966). See generally Weisgall, Stop,
Search and Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 219 (1974).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
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prominently mentioned. One judge commented, however, that state
habeas corpus had not been an area of inconsistency after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell.17 Apart from criminal
procedure, inconsistency apparently was not concentrated in any
particular areas. Several individual judges did, however, mention
its occurrence in environmental cases, immigration (particularly
deportation) cases, and in cases involving "nebulous concepts" such
as negligence. A district judge also made the general suggestion that
inconsistency occurred more in cases under new statutes "which
need to be interpreted" and under amended statutes.
Inconsistency occurred in the search and seizure area "more
than the whole rest of the field put together," according to one
circuit judge. Roughly half the judges mentioning search and seizure
specifically mentioned border searches or such closely related issues
as "stops with aliens" or "founded suspicion" to make stops. Their
view is consistent with the remarks of commentators who have al-
leged that the Ninth Circuit's judges have decided similar border
search cases differently." "Founded suspicion" is "a classic area,"
said one judge, emphasizing that it was impossible to achieve con-
sistency except by having the same people decide all the cases. Even
then they wouldn't be consistent, he added: "I can't remain consis-
tent with myself."3 On the other hand, one district judge felt that,
despite inconsistencies, the law was "falling into place more" in the
search area. Part of the reason for the greater inconsistency in this
area of the law, the reason why the judges felt they "can't do any-
thing about it," is that judges must deal with a "factual matrix" or
"cluster of factual circumstances," which judges view "through
their own filters." "Facts may appear to be identical but aren't,"
observed one district judge, one of whose colleagues added that
"there are decisions on the facts both ways," a result of the large
number of search cases. 0 Still another district judge drew a distinc-
37. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the Court held that a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence introduced in his trial was
obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure, if the state has provided a full and fair
opportunity for litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim.
38. For example, Weisgall states that the cases in the area show "numerous discrepan-
cies and inconsistencies." Weisgall, supra note 35, at 245. See also Klein, The Doctrine of
Founded Suspicion, 6 GoLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 509, 515 (1976); Gardner, supra note 20.
39. Inconsistency with respect to the insanity defense was also thought "intrinsic." One
judge noted that the court had heard De Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977), en banc "because one panel tried to change the law," and
the court would not take cases en banc when panels were applying the same law.
40. See the comments of Chief Judge John R. Brown of the Fifth Circuit:
In dynamic areas of the law such as search and seizure, warrantless arrests and searches,
the result frequently depends on nuances of the facts. From one set of facts to another,
1352 [Vol. 32:1343
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tion between "direct conflict[s]" and cases that go "in different
directions," which he said were more likely to be encountered.
Search cases, particularly where the exclusionary rule" was at
issue, were also more likely to produce inconsistency because, ac-
cording to a circuit judge, "some judges have higher thresholds of
indignation" than do others: "some feel all wiretapping is evil and
resolve all cases against the government," while others resolve all
cases for the government "which is trying to protect us." A district
judge also drew attention to the effect on inconsistency of appellate
judges' differing ideologies. Two Ninth Circuit judges, he said,
closely follow Packer's Due Process Mode4 2 and, in action he
thought unfair, "systematically reverse convictions below almost on
the ground they were criminal convictions." The presence of these
judges on a circuit panel produces results different from those ren-
dered by other judges, he said, noting that those appellate judges
had not experienced "a hotly contested criminal trial."" Another
area in which this judge felt results were affected by the judges'
predilection was antitrust. The judge claimed to be able to guess the
result in such cases from the make-up of the panel."
IV. GRAVrrY OF THE PROBLEM
While judges generally agree that inconsistency exists, and ex-
ists more in some areas than others, proportionately more circuit
judges (eleven of fourteen) than district judges (only five of eleven)
felt inconsistency was a "problem," and two of the three circuit
judges who said it was not a problem qualified their responses. One
as revealed in opinions, it can be a difficult process to attempt to distill what might be
called the contemporary law of the circuit.
FIRST PHASE, supra note 14, at 523-24.
41. The exclusionary rule basically requires that evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, as well as evidence arrived at through utilization of the illegally-seized
evidence, be excluded from use at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary
rule applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal prosecutions).
42. The Due Process Model is one of two value systems identified by Packer as compet-
ing for priority in the criminal process. The Due Process Model has as its prime goal the
minimization of errors in the criminal process, while the Crime Control Model has as its
central theme the proposition that repression of criminal conduct is the most important
function of the criminal process. For a discussion of Packer's models, see H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-246 (1968).
43. He added that circuit judges, some of whom debate about "whether trial judges
should give written instructions," "can't be serious" about the placement of a verb or an
adjective in jury instructions in a complicated case which has lasted several weeks making a
difference to a jury."
44. He called antitrust law "not law, not trust, not economics," but something which
"deals with American folklore and ideology."
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of the two said that it was not a problem "from a broad social
standpoint," because usually the result in the case was clear, as
where "the man was guilty anyway." However, said this judge, in-
consistency was still a problem to him; he worries about it and
thinks it should not exist. Similarly, one district judge commented
that inconsistency is bothersome because "the law should be pure."
On the other hand, one of his senior colleagues did not find himself
getting "terribly upset about it." In part this was because "we've
always had it" and in part because there were "lots of other unfair-
nesses" in the system, including the matter of who gets arrested and
who does not. He did, however, recognize that inconsistency was not
fair because "some get off and others do not."
Although they were concerned about it, none of the judges who
said inconsistency was a problem considered it extremely serious.
Inconsistency did, however, cause problems for the court, for exam-
ple, in terms of logistics. One judge said that it was a particular
problem for an active court to have to take cases en banc to resolve
inconsistencies because an en banc "takes a tremendous number of
hours." Circuit judges also had the concerns of district judges in
mind in making their evaluations. While inconsistency was thought
not to be serious because it happens only infrequently, it was the
"sort of thing district judges can grumble about." A stronger state-
ment was made by a former district judge, who said that inconsis-
tency was a problem at the district court level, especially in border
search cases. In such cases, he said, district judges "didn't know
what the hell law to apply." Another former district judge, who said
that inconsistency was serious in a theoretical sense, thought that
the problem was "more theoretical than real." He felt that district
judges magnified the problem by paying so much attention to un-
published memorandum cases, in which the circuit panel was trying
to decide "that particular case," never intending to distinguish the
case from others. On the other hand, he argued, there is less incon-
sistency in the court's published opinions, in which the court tried
to be more dispositive. People were made more excited by other
irremediable problems, said one judge. On the other hand, said
another, "If it troubles lawyers and district judges, it is a problem."
This judge, who considered inconsistency a "moderately serious"
problem, cautioned that there had been no "mass meetings" about
it. These remarks and others suggest that inconsistency is seen as
serious to the extent that it creates a public relations problem for
the court: it is "not a matter of deep concern unless a charge [of
inconsistency] is made." As other Ninth Circuit judges said, it
"makes us look kind of bad," and "isn't good public image, not a
healthy thing."
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The district judges who thought that inconsistency was not a
problem said it was "not glaring" or was "part of life." One re-
marked that it did not "make a great difference in the overall ad-
ministration of justice.""6 Another specifically noted that the court
would use an en banc hearing to resolve a "fundamental discrep-
ancy." District judges who did think that inconsistency is a problem
did not consider it a major one, although one "could hope for some-
thing better in precision of the law." A judge who found the incid-
ence of inconsistency "minimal" thought it could be "cured admin-
istratively, by a computer and good administrators."" Another dis-
trict judge, who said that inconsistency was not a problem for him,
claimed that it was not a big problem for the court, either, but
thought that it was more serious for litigants when cases depended
on the "luck of draw of the panel, like the luck of draw of the trial
judge." Describing the problem as "not as serious as I once
thought," this judge reported that a greater familiarity with the law
had led him to believe that "there is not as much inconsistency as
some practicing attorneys think." He added that the court is acutely
conscious of the problem. Nonetheless, he concluded, "If nothing is
done about workload, with more judges coming, so that complex
relationships will increase geometrically, it will increase the poten-
tial and the harm" from inconsistency.
Judges' perceptions of the seriousness of inconsistency can also
be studied by inquiring whether and to what extent judges talk to
each other about the problem. All of the circuit judges responding
said that inconsistency was discussed within the court, although two
said that such discussion was not frequent. Judges reported that
such discussion took place between panels, within the court's com-
mittees, at meetings of the circuit council, and at the court's annual
Symposium. One judge also quoted former Chief Judge Chambers:
"We pray with each other" about it. Judges also discussed the topic
on a one-to-one basis; only one circuit judge said this happened only
rarely.
All but one of the ten district judges responding said the topic
was discussed. Inconsistency would be discussed in a general way
or there would be an occasional remark when decisions were handed
down, with someone asking whether the judges had read some other
45. This judge felt that, in any event, courts don't make much difference in deterring
crime; it is, he said, "like sand in a sieve."
46. The reference to the computer was a suggestion that the court keep track of cases
with similar issues, so they could be heard by the same panel, or at least not handed down
until different panels confronting the same or similar issues could consult with each other.
See notes 77-78 infra and accompanying text.
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case arguably on point. For others, however, the subject was dis-
cussed frequently in order "to ferret out the law and how we should
follow it." "That's our bread and butter," observed one judge. An-
other pointed out that such discussion occurred most often when a
district judge was reversed. The topic was raised both with district
court colleagues and with circuit judges, although far more with the
former than with the latter. Several district judges indicated, how-
ever, that such discussion took place only with other district judges,
not with the circuit judges. Discussion of inconsistency between
district judges and circuit judges occurred primarily in the context
of individual cases, either when the district judge was writing the
opinion for a panel or when two panels had cases with a similar
issue. One veteran district judge remarked that when he was on a
panel where another panel had the same problem, the two panels
exchanged opinions and memoranda on how to avoid inconsistency.
This judge thought that that was a good way to deal with the prob-
lem, as the issues were handled more thoroughly than they would
have been had there been a face-to-face meeting of all the judges
involved.
The judges were also asked whether inconsistency had been
discussed during the circuit judicial conferences-the annual meet-
ings of circuit and district judges and lawyers at which the circuit's
business is examined and discussed." Seven circuit judges said it
had been discussed and three that it had not been, although one of
these qualified his answer by saying it had not been discussed "on
the floor" of the conference. Four judges said that they didn't know
whether the subject had been raised, with one of these commenting
that it should be. One of the newer circuit judges, who commented
that judges "visit" about inconsistency when they are together,
understood that there had been programs on the subject in the past.
Another new member of the court, who said that the subject was
discussed, indicated that "we didn't think there was any
[inconsistency]." While the subject was not a "formal agenda
item," said several others, it came up informally in various ways.
Although a senior circuit judge stated that the topic had indeed
been raised-by the district judges-the few district judges answer-
ing the question said the topic had not been discussed.
47. For one Ninth Circuit judge's views on the circuit judicial conference, see Wallace,
Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe with Only Chiefs, 1978
B.Y.U.L. REV. 39, 59-62.
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V. CAUSES OF INCONSISTENCY
The judges had offered some explanations for inconsistency in
the course of their comments about those areas of the law in which
inconsistency was more likely to occur." When the question of the
causes of inconsistency was addressed directly in the interviews, the
judges identified a variety of causes, but clearly felt that the princi-
pal cause was judges' attitudes or ideologies. This reason was offered
by roughly half the circuit judges and half the district judges who
responded. Many judges also named as a major cause of inconsis-
tency either the size of the Ninth Circuit caseload or the large num-
ber of judges used to process that caseload. Virtually every cause the
judges suggested was, however, internal to the court. Only one sen-
ior district judge who sat principally as a Ninth Circuit appeals
judge mentioned an external cause of inconsistency: lack of guid-
ance from the Supreme Court.
Inconsistency was never intentional, stressed several judges.
"Panel A does not want to come out with a different result from
another panel," said one district judge." Inconsistency resulted in-
stead from inadvertence or a "lack of adequate monitoring" of cases
with common subject-matter so that decisions by different panels
could be reconciled before being issued. One judge said that be-
tween the point at which a panel received a case and the time the
case was decided there was a "critical time" in which other panels
might decide related cases that might not come to the judges' atten-
tion. This problem is exacerbated by "delays in getting opinions
out." Another circuit judge referred to a "blind spot" from issuance
of the slip sheet to publication of bound volumes-when cases might
escape judges' attention. 0 Still another judge suggested that the
primary cause of inconsistency was lawyers' failure to call cases on
point to the court's attention. Only one circuit judge noted the
court's use of unpublished opinions as a potential cause of inconsis-
tency. That judge, who said he knew about such conflicts from
sitting on panels with identical issues, felt that inconsistency had
increased in the last two to three years as unpublished opinions were
used.51 Because the parties could not cite prior unpublished opin-
48. See notes 34-44 supra and accompanying text.
49. We "hardly ever go haywire on findable precedent," said one circuit judge.
50. In 1977, the Ninth Circuit arranged to have West Publishing Company print its slip
opinions and prepare an index which could be used to identify cases on any given topic. This
served to reduce, but not entirely eliminate, the "blind spot" referred to here. See note 78
infra and accompanying text.
51. The actual shift from use of published memorandum orders to unpublished opinions
occurred in late 1972, and thus had been in effect for over 4 /2 years at the time of this
interview.
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ions, he said that the judges remain unaware of a case with the same
facts. 2
Several judges were of the opinion that the court's volume of
cases (its "tremendous caseload" and the "pressure of business")
contributed to inconsistency. Said a senior circuit judge, addressing
the matter at length, "More and more, we find, unwittingly, panels
dealing with the same issues. An increase in the number of judges
will increase it. We cannot keep up with what every other member
of the court writes." Inconsistency, he added, is "not based on the
willingness of the judge to disregard cases; at times they are not
aware." It is just that there is "so damned much stuff" to contend
with. This comment clearly shows the relationship between incon-
sistency and both caseload and number of judges. So does his col-
league's observation that there is difficulty in coordinating the flow
of information when the court uses more than fifty different judges;a
increased caseload made precedent much harder to find. As another
judge remarked, the larger the circuit-that is, the larger the num-
ber of judges-the more likely it is that inconsistency will occur. As
a district judge put it, "The bigger the court, the more difficult it
is to arrive at a consensus." Although some degree of predictability
was desired by the judges, he said that they knew of no way to
predict the predilection of a panel when the court drew on such a
large number of individuals for panels. With many people, this
judge said, you "don't have a court, you have many courts." An-
other district judge helped put the matter in perspective with his
observation that "no matter how you divided up the Ninth Circuit,
you'd have the same number of judges" and thus "would have the
same inconsistencies as between circuits."
The law itself was thought to be a cause of inconsistency. Incon-
sistency resulted in areas in which the law is "difficult" or because
the law was "so broad and unsettled" in the areas-like search and
seizure-where inconsistency occurred most frequently. In such
areas judges try to distinguish past cases from each other, thus
52. He said Gardner had "exaggerated" in his article and had been "somewhat unfair."
During the Hruska Commission hearings, Dean Roger Cramton quoted Dean Griswold to the
effect that use of unpublished opinions without precedential value "was essentially an outrage
in which judges were purporting not to take their own prior decisions seriously and departing
from stare decisis and not being really concerned about their fundamental obligation under
a system in which equal justice under law is to treat litigants the same way, and to take their
prior decisions seriously." COMMIssIoN ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL CouRT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
SECOND PHASE HEARINGS: 1974-1975, at 538 [hereinafter cited as SECOND PHASE].
53. The actual number was 70 per year, if one includes the court's own active-duty
judges and the "extra" judges (senior circuit judges, district judges, and out-of-circuit
"visitors").
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creating at least the appearance of inconsistency." "None of the
judges would purposely overlook cases which go in another direc-
tion," said one judge, but some would try to distinguish these cases
''and some of those efforts are flawed." According to one senior
circuit judge, the greatest cause of inconsistency was "writing
around" another decision. This occurs when there are "two opposing
theories of law where the judges on each side are trying to avoid the
effect of decisions on the other side."5 5
Many judges thought that the judges' ideologies were a major
cause of inconsistency. One judge who had "never seen [Democrat-
Republican] politics as such affect decisions" in criminal law said
that politics played a part when the judges were deciding economic
issues, for example, in Labor Board cases, in which this judge
claimed to be able to tell when "staunch Republicans" are on the
panel. "Strong philosophical disagreements" within the court and
the presence of one or two judges who "want to reverse all criminal
cases" led to a situation where, when certain judges are on a panel,
there is "trouble like a conjunction of stars," requiring an en banc
sitting of the court. A self-styled "strict constructionist" judge
echoed this theme in observing that some judges wanted to "help
defendants and punish the police or punish defendants and help the
police." Judges' "different notions of justice," most "forthright in
criminal areas, . . . reflect different approaches in society," said a
circuit judge. He felt that judges cannot be convinced to change
their minds about such notions, which color their perceptions of
facts. Several other judges agreed that inconsistency resulted from
differences in perception of fact. One said that it depends on how
particular facts are evaluated by the judge."
Commenting on this subject, a district judge said that "judges
don't differ so much on the law but on how they view the facts."
Because "the reasoning processes of individuals are different," the
law is viewed differently by each individual judge, affecting how
54. Said one district judge, "Judges never say to hell with a case; they can distinguish
it."
55. See the comments by Judge Alvin Rubin (E.D.La., now 5th Cir.):
[A] panel of three other judges may feel either that the rule is "wrong" or that it should
not apply to the case they are considering. So an understandable desire to decide today's
case in accordance with the proclivities of the panel now sitting seems to lead to opinions
that fail to accord to prior decisions the willing acceptance and wholehearted enforce-
ment that trial judges are expected to accord appellate decisions. Instead, these later
opinions seem to distinguish the earlier decisions on an ad hoc basis.
Rubin, supra note 26, at 452.
56. Recall the earlier discussion of areas in which inconsistency occurred most fre-
quently; several judges there talked of judges looking at factual circumstances through their
own perceptual filters. See notes 34-44 supra and accompanying text.
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each applies the law to a set of facts. This judge argued that the
circuit judges "find the facts 'up there' (in the court of appeals)
whether they think they do or not.""7 Another district judge, of a
different ideological persuasion, also spoke of Ninth Circuit judges'
tendency to "rewrite the facts"-to the point where he didn't
"recognize one of my cases when it comes down." The circuit judges,
he felt, "end up deciding those cases the way they feel they ought
to be decided," making "their statements of fact support their con-
clusions."
Differences between judges resulted not only from the effect of
varying criminal justice ideologies on fact patterns. Differing atti-
tudes affect intracircuit inconsistency in any area with new or nebu-
lous concepts. Judges, often "people who know a governor or a presi-
dent," may still have widely divergent views of the law in such
areas. As a district judge explained, some judges are "advocates,
always trying to make a point, trying to move the court over to their
position, to change the law of the circuit," while others are content
to adhere more closely to existing circuit precedent. Such disparate
judicial philosophies may be based on different background and
experience. One circuit judge called particular attention to differ-
ences between appellate judges who had been trial judges and those
who had been academicians or "who have been on the circuit court
so long that they had forgotten what the inside of a trial court looks
like." The resulting rigid frame of mind would lead a judge to try
to make a panel "digress" from what he thought its proper path.
VI. PARTICIPATION BY "ExTRAS"
None of the judges volunteered the opinion that district judges
or judges from outside the circuit who sit with the Ninth Circuit,
the so-called "extra" judges, helped cause inconsistency. When
asked specifically about the use of "extra" judges, the circuit judges
generally agreed that the participation of the circuit's own senior
appellate judges or its district judges did not contribute to intracir-
cuit inconsistency; opinion with respect to judges from outside the
circuit was divided.
Agreement was clearest concerning the senior circuit judges.
Only one of six circuit judges responding" felt that the "seniors"
contributed to intracircuit inconsistency, and he did not feel that
57. As an example, he mentioned a "founded suspicion" case in which one of the two
most liberal Ninth Circuit judges had reversed another judge in his district.
58. For reasons of time consumed by the interviews, not all judges were asked this set
of questions.
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they did so significantly. Six of nine circuit judges felt that district
judges also did not contribute to inconsistency, with two more say-
ing that they didn't know." One of the six said they did so "no more
than [did] the mingling of the court's own judges," and another
said that they did not do so except in "aberrational circumstances."
Indeed, still another circuit judge observed that district judges were
more inclined to follow than to depart from a circuit judge majority.
A district judge's causing inconsistency was "not unheard of," but
seldom would a district judge write a "full-fledged dissent." A senior
district judge who felt that district judges were dissenting with in-
creasing frequency claimed, however, that this had "not contributed
to differences between panels."
Of the three circuit judges who did feel that district judges
contributed to inconsistency, two, both of whom had been district
judges, were quite outspoken; all three felt that district judges' con-
tribution to inconsistency was significant."o One said that there were
severe problems in having district judges sit with the Ninth Circuit,
because they were not aware of trends of the circuit and thus were
"out of step." District judges also were very busy. Arguing for dis-
trict judges being given "credit" for sitting with the appeals court
so they could take time off from district court duties to work on
court of appeals cases, this judge thought the present arrangement
an "imposition." He claimed that the current system also led the
appeals court to give "lighter" cases to district court judges. The
second judge, noting that the presence of district judges created
"uncertainty" about circuit precedent, argued that the court loses
"harmony of decision and integrity of precedent" when a "whole lot
of strangers are dabbling in writing law"-an argument he also
applied to the use of judges from outside the circuit. Part of the
problem, this judge believed, involved communication: district
judges did not participate in the Ninth Circuit's conferences and
were not part of the circuit's process of ongoing internal communica-
tion. The comments by the third judge were less harsh. The pres-
ence of a district judge "increases the multiplicity of views," this
judge observed. Some district judge-caused inconsistency was, he
thought, "idiosyncratic," as when a judge simply decides not to
follow the law of the circuit-just as "some judges refuse to go along
with the Supreme Court."
59. Three district judges said that their district judge colleagues did not contribute to
inconsistency; another said he didn't know.
60. All three agreed that it did not matter whether the district judges were active-duty
or senior judges.
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Ten circuit judges divided evenly as to whether out-of-circuit,
or "visiting," judges contributed to inconsistency; another said he
didn't know. The sparse comments offered by the judges reflect
their view that the problem, to the extent it exists, is not thought
to be serious. "They go along," said one senior circuit judge suc-
cinctly. It would be an "aberrational" circumstance in which they
did contribute to inconsistency, said others, "possible" but
"negligible," and significant only very rarely. One remembered an
outside senior circuit judge who "went off the deep end in one case
four years ago" but could recall no others. Nor had the district
judges seen any other evidence of visitor-caused inconsistency. A
district judge reported that a visiting judge with whom he had
served was as well aware of the Ninth Circuit position as he was.',
Those who did feel that the visitors contributed to inconsistency
made relatively mild comments. For example, one thought that it
occurred "more than with district judges." Another judge, who
thought that visiting judges "don't feel compelled to keep up with
the law of the [Ninth] circuit," suggested that it was not a signifi-
cant problem unless many visiting judges sat with the court-but
not many did so.
If the judges generally did not feel that participation by the
"extras" directly contributed to the existence and extent of intracir-
cuit inconsistency, responses to other questions seemed to indicate
that the judges felt that the large number of judges participating in
the court's work did magnify the problem of inconsistency-and
certainly the "extra" judges increased the number of participants.
In discussing why they felt that a court with a larger number of
judges had a greater need for en banc sittings, the judges offered as
one reason a higher frequency of inconsistency resulting from a large
number of judges, the more judges there were, the greater was the
possibility that any single judge would disagree with a panel's deci-
sion. Indeed, one judge felt that the number of conflicts would in-
crease in a geometric fashion, the more decisions the court issued;
a colleague disagreed, however, saying that the increase would be
not geometric but only arithmetic. In either event, more judges
meant more "imperfect people" who would produce "some mis-
takes" and "less unanimity of thought." On the other hand, if an
appellate court had only three or five judges, all of whom were
61. That visiting judges try to inform themselves of the law of the visited circuit is
reflected in the comments of a senior district judge with considerable experience both with
the Ninth Circuit and outside the circuit. When he sat elsewhere, he said, he "tried to abide
by the law of that circuit."
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located in the same building, "they'd work things out,"12 although
"that is not necessarily good."
VII. MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING INCONSISTENCY
When asked how they cope with inconsistency, the judges were
virtually unanimous in stating that mechanisms were available to
reduce or avoid the problem." There was far less agreement, how-
ever, on what those mechanisms were. Moreover, judges disagreed
on whether other mechanisms were available by which the court
could avoid or reduce inconsistency. Two-thirds of the circuit
judges-ten of fifteen-and all seven district judges responding said
that such mechanisms existed; the mechanisms suggested by the
judges were, however, generally like those already indicated as being
used by the court.
Much reduction or avoidance of inconsistency results from ac-
tion by individual judges; "judges have to do it themselves," said
one. At bottom, said one senior circuit judge, limiting inconsistency
depends on "my information and the information in the hands of
the panel." Judges did say that they tried to increase their level of
information. Asked what they did so their decisions would be consis-
tent with circuit precedent, several judges talked of reading, study-
ing, or paying particular attention to the court's cases. Some judges
reported using the LEXIS computer system and "Shepardizing
religiously" to avoid missing relevant cases.
The judges use a variety of other aids in their effort to remain
current with the law. Two circuit judges keep notebooks, one being
particularly careful to record "something out of line." The new West
index system would, however, be better than his method, he said.
Keeping a notebook, however helpful it might be, said the other
judge, wasn't enough, because judges today do not have the time to
do everything that a judge twenty years ago might have done. He
found that he had to rely on his law clerks, but that was unsatisfac-
tory since they were only with him for a year and "don't know what
happened three or four years ago."
External stimuli were necessary to call possible inconsistencies
to the judges' attention. Some judges rely on lawyers' briefs or oral
62. Judge Duniway remarked to the Hruska Commission that, after his experience on
the California Court of Appeals, he was "astonished" that inconsistency did not develop in
the Ninth Circuit. The reason, however, "was that at that time there were seven of us here
in this building. We went to lunch together and we would inevitably talk shop and, there was
another case pending involving a question you had, you almost automatically found out about
it." FmRsT PHASE, supra note 14, at 901.
63. Only one district judge said there were none.
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argument. Said one district judge who felt that lawyers should point
out existing circuit law, "If people do their work, it will be evident
to the panel that a case exists." "You would hope," said another
judge, "that lawyers would bring contrary authority to bear." Judge
John Kilkenny, in comments to the Hruska Commission, noted
that, when a case was docketed, counsel were notified "to inform us
as to related cases so they can calendar together," something he felt
helps significantly to eliminate conflicts. 4 One judge, who tried to
read all the court's opinions-and had his clerks read all the court's
opinions and memoranda-noted that some of his colleagues had
said they could not read all the court's opinions because "with our
flood of stuff, it is impractical.""5 As a result, the judges rely on
lawyers to raise the issue of inconsistency through petitions for re-
hearing, which can lead the panel to revise its opinions. One mecha-
nism for correction noted by Gardner is that "the three-judge panel
that originally decided the case may correct the result at the behest
of a party or sua sponte. "" Rehearing petitions, however, simply
increased the required reading, and at least one judge did not read
petitions for rehearing en banc unless he was on the panel initially
deciding the case. He did, however, read his colleagues' requests for
en banc rehearings, as did another judge, particularly for cases
heard by panels on which this judge had not sat: this practice let
him "pick up aberrational cases" through "screams from the losing
party."67
A. En Bancs
Among the mechanisms for resolving inconsistency which in-
volve collegial action by the court, the most obvious was the holding
of en banc sessions of the court to establish new precedent for the
circuit, perhaps by reconciling conflicting rulings. En banc courts
may, however, be called not to resolve intracircuit conflicts but to
make major new policy decisions where the vast majority of a large
court does not wish to be disfranchised from participation in the
decision because they are not members of the panel deciding the
issue." Asked specifically about the relationship between court size
64. FIRsT PHASE, supra note 14, at 826.
65. That concern seems to be shared by the judges of the other large court of appeals,
the Fifth Circuit. "It is very burdensome for each judge to read and analyze all of the opinions
of the other 14 judges." Id. at 392. (Statement by Judges Gewin, Morgan, Clark, Coleman,
Godbold, Dyer, Simpson, and Bell).
66. Gardner, supra note 20, at 1225.
67. If a panel decision seemed inconsistent with the court's prior rulings, there would,
he noted, be a "blizzard of memos," which increased once a decision was made to go en banc.
68. Howard has suggested that this is the predominant reason for the calling of en banc
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and the need for en bancs, the judges agreed that as the number of
judges on an appeals court increased, en banc sittings were needed
more. Only one judge of fifteen thought that the need for en bancs
did not change as the court's size increased and only one (generally
opposed to en bancs) thought that, because of the greater panel
autonomy which accompanied the increased number of judges, the
need for en banc sittings actually decreased with court size. The
judges also were asked whether the increase in the number of judges
altered the effectiveness -of en banc sittings of the court. Twelve of
fifteen circuit judges felt that lessened effectiveness would result.
One of the other three said that an en banc court would not be any
more of a problem than a three-judge panel would be, but the other
two were more hesitant. One said that effectiveness would remain
unchanged only "up to a point," and the other was troubled by
added judge time even without changed en banc effectiveness.
Differing reasons were offered for the lessened effectiveness of
en banc sittings of a larger court. With more judges, it is more
difficult to get all the judges together in one place at one time, with
considerable time consumed in the process. Finding a mutually con-
venient time to meet was particularly difficult because judges'
schedules were set several months in advance. Much additional
time was consumed by the procedure surrounding an en banc, be-
fore and, especially, after it is held. One judge called all the "ying-
yang" over whether the court should go en banc "oppressive," al-
though he thought that the cases actually taken by the court en
banc were not oppressive. Other judges pointed to the "much more
ponderous procedure" after argument, involving time-consuming
postargument discussion and circulation of opinions aimed at trying
to shape an opinion of the court. The time between oral argument
and disposition is much more extended than with a three-judge
panel's disposition of a case. "More people are griping at footnotes
and language" in the en banc opinion, as the court was "forever
trying to hammer something out." A judge who called the en banc
a "clumsy mechanism" also complained of "more people in the act,
more disparity in view, and more writing to bring about an opin-
ion." An attitude of "us versus them" would develop so that there
would be more en bancs, particularly on significant questions. One
judge commented that with a large number of judges, it was a little
like "Quo Vadis," with two "teams," limiting the benefit of en banc
courts in the Fifth Circuit, the other extremely large U.S. Court of Appeals. Comments by J.
Woodford Howard, panel on Decision-Making on Federal Courts of Appeals, American Politi-
cal Science Association meetings, Washington, D.C. (September 2, 1979).
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oral argument because some judges "don't ask questions, they make
more argument" than in panels. The judge making these observa-
tions felt those arguments could be heard in conference; he wanted
to hear the lawyers, something difficult with the "more adversary"
atmosphere of an en banc.
Judges were thought to be reluctant to agree to hold en banc
courts because of these difficulties: the "disincentives" to take a
case en banc, said an active-duty circuit judge, "go up and up and
up." One senior circuit judge noted that the active-duty judges were
tired of en bancs and want to avoid them. The court seldom agreed
to an en banc at a lawyer's request; a call for an en banc from within
the court usually initiated the process, and "the call is always apolo-
getic" in tone. That the more junior members of the court lacked
familiarity with what a senior circuit judge called the en banc's
"horrors" in consuming judge-time made them less reluctant to call
for them, he said, and made it more likely that they would be held.
Problems with en banc proceedings had led the court to discuss
using a "short" en banc, one involving less than the court's full
active-duty membership. At the time of the interviews, however,
agreement could not be reached on specific procedures. If, for exam-
ple, only the most senior active-duty judges were to sit, there might
be "stratification": the en bane would be disproportionately made
up of judges appointed by one president, while those appointed by
a later chief executive would not be able to sit. Yet the judges were
fully aware of what was soon to happen; as one noted, "Congress will
force us to have a foreshortened en banc, if we are to get more
judges."" This judge, taking a position which he said diverged from
that of his colleagues, said that he did not want a short en banc,
because having an en banc with twenty-three judges would mean
that en banc courts would seldom be called, a thought which
pleased him.
B. Screening
Many judges also mentioned screening or monitoring devices
and the circulation of opinions with the court as other principal
means for reducing or avoiding inconsistency. Monitoring or screen-
ing in order to alert judges to cases which might create inconsistency
69. In the Omnibus Judgeship Bill of 1978, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits were given the
authority to establish short en bancs, as long as only one en banc court existed at one time.
Act of October 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1976)). It was anticipated by the sponsors that membership was not restricted on a geo-
graphic basis. See 64 A.B.A.J. 1641, 1641-42 (1978). The en banc court could, however, have
variable membership.
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is important because it provides the judges with crucial informa-
tion. Concerning the need for expanded monitoring, one judge
noted:
Several of the judges and I have talked about a monitoring system so that when
Panel X has Y case, they will know when they go on the bench-or shortly
thereafter-that another panel has the same issue, in order to alert panels so
they can get their heads together, and thus could avoid a confrontation issue
or have one panel write and the other follow.
That this proposal closely followed the court's General Order on
interpanel contacto may suggest the degree to which that rule was
not being effectively implemented. Calendaring similar cases before
a single panel would, of course, be preferable, but as the court's
mechanisms for such calendaring were underdeveloped at the time
of the interviews, the more immediate problem was to deal with
cases already being decided by different panels. Each panel needs
to know what other panels are doing so that, when they are dealing
with cases containing common issues, the panels can have "more
immediate communication," and can decide that one panel will
decide its case(s) first, with the second "falling into line."" Some
judges suggested that when similar issues are involved, an exchange
of draft opinions could assist in reducing inconsistency. 2 In such
situations, if one panel will "take the trouble" to distinguish the
cases as to the facts, the possibility of inconsistency is removed with
"no change in results." That draft opinions be exchanged is consid-
ered crucial for, as one district judge noted, once the slip opinion is
published, "the panel is committed." Later resolution of inconsis-
tency is much more difficult to accomplish although slip opinions
can be amended. A suggestion with a broader reach came from a
district judge who thought that in "important cases" the members
of the court could read drafts of opinions from other panels before
the opinions were released. Judge Goodwin had earlier urged the
circulation of opinions "before anything is mailed out to the attor-
neys, or to the parties," so that the court could catch inconsistencies
and "save the embarrassment of having to go through this en banc
procedure when we have a conflict." He noted, however, that a
majority of the court had not voted to accept the suggestion.
Staff attorneys, law clerks, and "knowledgeable" people in the
70. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, General Order No. 8, April 1, 1974.
71. Wasby, supra note 5, at 7-8.
72. One judge later talked of the possibility of "computerized drafts" of opinions, some-
thing he called "twenty-first century electronics."
73. FlIsT PHASE, supra note 14, at 821. Judge Kilkenny, with whom he was testifying,
also said that the rule, used in the Tenth Circuit, "might be a good rule." Id. at 818.
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clerk's office-all part of "the whole staff process"-were used to
"pre-screen" or monitor cases. In 1975, Judge Goodwin had told the
Hruska Commission that "We don't even know in advance of oral
argument that another panel has the same question on another case;
and we don't have an institutionalized way of finding out." Such a
mechanism could be developed, "but it means using staff differently
than we're doing now." As of that time, Goodwin felt that the
court's staff was not adequate to cope with the problem of identify-
ing cases with common issues." By 1977 that situation had changed,
yet a circuit judge observed that the process remained "diffused,"
with "responsibility not focused." "Someone must be charged with
the duty," one district judge pointed out. According to a circuit
judge, a "properly paid court executive with an adequate staff"
would be able to "catch differences of opinion" when the panels
decided cases and slip opinions were published, a backup to a pre-
screening process. Another judge suggested greater and more effi-
cient use of staff attorneys, and the clerk's office, and, more gener-
ally, the use of the central staff in more sophisticated ways to help
avoid and reduce inconsistency. Indeed, shortly after these inter-
views, the court did act to strengthen its staff attorney system by
establishing additional staff attorney positions and by hiring a new
head for the staff attorney office."
The judges considered staff attorneys to be particularly impor-
tant for any screening or monitoring program; more than one judge
said that reliance on their own law clerks was no longer sufficient if
they were to keep on top of matters. One circuit judge, however, said
it was his law clerks' "mission" to find cases related to the ones he
was considering; another remained consistent with the court's deci-
sions, after he had read cases, by arguing with his law clerks. With-
out the staff law clerks' work, a panel would find out that another
panel had a similar question only coincidentally. Indeed, said one
judge, the staff attorney system was intended to spot common prob-
lems before different panels. He felt that proper use of the staff
attorney would be sufficient to solve the inconsistency problem.
Other judges, although not as optimistic, nonetheless made clear
their feeling that staff assistance was very important.
A circuit judge who claimed not to be an advocate of the use of
computers in the law suggested that the proper information could
be "put in a computer by a good computer programmer." Two dis-
74. SECOND PHASE, supra note 52, at 1010.
75. Professor Arthur Hellmann, formerly Deputy Executive Director of the Commission
on Revision of the Federal Appellate Court System, who was named to the post, returned to
teaching in mid-1979.
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trict judges also mentioned computerization, one placing it among
the "administrative methods" which could serve in "minimizing the
minimal" inconsistency he saw in the court.6 In suggesting addi-
tional mechanisms which might be used by the court, one judge
urged that the LEXIS system for retrieval of information about
cases be used more widely. "If everything were on LEXIS," this
judge said, it "would limit the chances of inconsistency."Consonant
with the prescreening idea was the suggestion that staff attorneys
create a categorized inventory of cases in order better to identify
potential and actual conflicts. In 1975, Judge Goodwin had stated,
"Ideally, I would like to see our staff get hold of cases as soon as they
are filed, tag them, mark them with radioactive carbon or some-
thing and then trace them so we don't have this intracircuit
[inconsistency] problem." 7 Staff attorneys could easily feed neces-
sary information to the judges in the course of preparing bench
memoranda. Use of the West publishing system and the index of
cases West had begun to prepare for the court to aid in reducing
inconsistency was also suggested. One judge, who felt that inconsis-
tency would be reduced if opinions were printed more quickly after
they were decided, claimed that cases were printed and digested
sooner under the West publishing arrangement than under the
court's previous methods. Instead of six weeks elapsing between the
filing of an opinion and the arrival of the West advance sheets, now
there were only fifteen or twenty days between the filing of an opin-
ion and the arrival of the slip sheet with West headnotes already
printed on it. On the other hand, he noted, the new arrangement
with West would not pick up all the cases some judges felt the court
might need."
C. Circulation of Opinions
An important way of reducing or avoiding inconsistency is com-
munication among the judges, including the general "intramural
76. The computer has been used to assist the court in the calendaring of cases. See
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CALEN9: A CALENDARING AND ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM FOR COURTS OF
APPEALS (1978).
77. SECOND PHASE, supra note 52, at 1010. See also FiRsT PHASE, supra note 14, at 356,
363 (comments by Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit). On the matter of an index
of unpublished cases in order to avoid inconsistency caused by those cases, see the exchanges
between Judge Robert A. Sprecher (7th Cir.) and Commission members Judge Roger Robb
(D.C. Cir.) and Francis Kirkham and Executive Director Professor Leo Levin, SECOND PHASE,
supra note 52, at 536-38.
78. Because West only published slip opinions for cases ultimately to appear in Federal
Reporter, not the "Not for Publication" cases, the index was limited to the former. One
district judge said that he used the Sheppard citator to find relevant district court cases
elsewhere in the circuit-perhaps ones likely to be appealed.
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discussion" that occurs particularly if cases are being considered, or
have been accepted by the court, for en banc hearing. Discussion
between members of a panel, which often does not occur until after
a case is argued although it does occur afterwards, was also sug-
gested as an important, if obvious, inconsistency-reducing tech-
nique.79 The Ninth Circuit also tried to have the judges, in the week
after oral argument, circulate to all the other judges a short synopsis
of cases likely to produce inconsistency.0 This device "died, like
most matters with more work," because some judges failed to write
their memoranda and the court lacked a mechanism for "tracking"
them. Moreover, this circulation of memoranda about issues likely
to produce inconsistency was found to be difficult because of the
"flood of paper we're in." This failure does not, however, imply the
absence of other types of communication that may serve to identify
inconsistency. For example, a judge who dislikes the decision of a
panel on which he is not sitting may write to that panel. Such
memoranda, particularly if stimulated by petitions for rehearing,
often result in changes in opinions.8 1 Moreover, several judges men-
tioned circulation of opinions before they were filed as a way of
reducing and avoiding inconsistency because, in the words of a sen-
ior circuit judge, it allowed the court to "sort out stuff before it is
far enough [along] to cause problems." Another senior judge men-
tioned the court's rule-"in the main disregarded"-that an opinion
be circulated to other members of the court. The Third Circuit's rule
that all opinions proposed for publication circulate within the whole
court before being filed8 2 "would catch three-fourths of the court's
present inconsistencies," said one judge. Another circuit judge felt,
however, that while that method works for the Third Circuit, it
would fail in the Ninth. That judge thought that there were too
many Ninth Circuit judges, who are often out of contact with each
other for as much as four to seven weeks, for circulation of opinions
to have much practical value in countering inconsistency.
Asked specifically whether they circulated opinions to judges
79. Washy, supra note 5, at 3, 6.
80. Judge Ozell Trask had mentioned "some syllabi of some sort that will be circulated
about opinions in question." SECOND PHASE, supra note 52, at 946.
81. See FIRST PHASE, supra note 14, at 379 (comments of Judge John C. Godbold). Judge
Godbold stated that he had called his colleagues to say, "'I have read your opinion in such a
matter; and how about reading the following case, which I think you will find is directly
contrary to what you have decided.' In both instances the judge wrote back and said, 'You
are right, I will have to withdraw the opinion.' " Judge Godbold said he feared that he would
turn out an opinion contrary to one recently decided by the court; in the instances he men-
tioned, he was "totally familiar" with the points and was aware that each ruling was "con-
trary to a case decided by this circuit within the past few months."
82. 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE CH. 5, § C.
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other than those on the panel hearing a case, twelve of fifteen circuit
judges indicated that they did so, but only rarely. When judges did
circulate cases to judges who were not on the panel, it was usually
part of an effort to coordinate with the rest of the court when an-
other panel was considering a similar problem. On the other hand,
only three of nine district judges reported following this practice,
with one commenting that it was improper because the "other
judges don't have a background on the case or familiarity with the
briefs." Ten of twelve circuit judges thought the practice helpful,"
but a question as to whether the practice would be helpful if it were
expanded produced a mixed response. The judges were evenly div-
ided on the issue" and those who felt greater circulation of opinions
would be helpful hedged their views. For example, a district judge
who favored the idea also thought that it might be too time-
consuming and indicated that it couldn't be done well with all cases.
Because of the time constraints, some judgment would have to be
made as to the importance of a particular case before an opinion was
articulated.
Court-wide circulation of opinions might well be useful in com-
batting inconsistency even if it were limited to cases which other-
wise would have to be set for en banc hearing-to overrule a prior
decision of the court, for example. Judge Eugene Wright com-
mented to the Hruska Commission that while circulation of opin-
ions outside a panel to the entire court was only rarely undertaken,
it was done "if we happen to have a problem which under our own
procedure involves the overruling of a prior opinion of the court" in
order to obtain "observations or concurrence or objections before an
opinion is filed."" A district court colleague whose view was colored
by his perception that inconsistency was not a sufficiently serious
problem to warrant the remedy also observed that it "wouldn't be
cost-effective to do it across the board" because it would "water
down" the existing practice of communication when other judges
were aware of the issues. The circuit judge most strongly advocating
the practice, who said that "judges could look [at the opinions] if
they wanted," indicated that "beady-eyed law clerks" would catch
inconsistencies. On the other hand, a colleague who opposed the
idea thought that only a "speedreader" could read every opinion:
the suggestion that all opinions be circulated "boggles the mind,"
83. One district judge, who did not himself engage in the practice, said he had been
the beneficiary of it.
84. Seven circuit judges in favor, seven opposed; two district judges for, two against.
One additional circuit judge said he did not know.
85. FiRST PHASE, supra note 14, at 728.
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he said. Several other judges also mentioned the lack of time to read
the opinion. They noted a problem in keeping up even with the
court's slip opinions. Increased circulation of opinions would not be
practicable, they thought, unless judges had additional staff to help
read the opinions. While the judges would "pick up some useful
ideas" from the practice, it would only work if the court were
smaller and all the judges were in the same place. Judge Duniway
argued before the Hruska Commission that full circulation of all
opinions, debated within the court "many times," would result in
an inordinate delay in the filing of opinions or else "you would not
really read them and then it would be just circulated paper for no
purpose.""
Those opposed to greater circulation of opinions to off-panel
judges made similar comments. The court was "too big, too far
apart [with] too many judges" for the device to be effective, said
one senior circuit judge. Another, who felt that the Third Circuit
started its practice when it was "overmanned," went further, saying
the practice was bound to reduce both the quality and quantity of
the court's decisions. A district judge believed that the results would
be "negative" if it were done "automatically," particularly if the
judges were to be expected to read the off-panel opinions critically.
This, he observed, was difficult for circuit judges and worse for the
district judges. He argued that the device should be used only if one
had "a unique case with a judge skilled in a unique field." Unless a
case were to result in a published opinion, the practice certainly was
not useful because the opinions in "Not for Publication" cases told
their readers too little, forcing judges to read the briefs if they were
to understand the case. The off-panel judge would be further hind-
ered, a district judge noted, by not having heard oral argument in
the case and by not having the record before him.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whatever view one adopts of the magnitude or gravity of intra-
86. Id. at 901. The judges, he said, had "almost without dissent every time it has come
up, said, 'Look, we have got so much to read already. We have got so much paper work to
do. We have got so many briefs to read. We have got our own cases to decide."'
The judges of the Fifth Circuit, the other court with a large number of judges, had raised
the same sorts of concerns. "Pre-release circulation of at least all signed opinions" would "in
large measure" avoid intracircuit conflicts leading to en banc proceedings, but "the adoption
of such a sound judicial standard is hardly feasible . . . in a court rendering an inordinate
number of opinions." Id. at 392. (Statement of Judges Gewin, Morgan, Clark, Coleman,
Godbold, Dyer, Simpson and Bell). Judge Bell later suggested that "such circulation is
practical only in a smaller court;" it could not be done in the Fifth Circuit where "the opinion
reading load . . . can only be described as oppressive." Id. at 454 (statement of Griffin Bell).
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circuit inconsistency, mechanisms to resolve it are deficient. There
was near unanimity among the judges that the mechanisms for
avoiding or reducing inconsistency were not adequate; nine of ten
circuit judges and three of four district judges said so. Although the
one district judge who thought the mechanisms adequate said that
inconsistency is "taken care of," the one circuit judge who thought
the mechanisms adequate said that those he had noted would be
adequate if used but were not being used now. This judge did think,
however, that progress was being made. One judge reported that he
could not yet tell whether the new mechanisms, such as the use of
the West index, would solve the problem. Those judges who felt
there were no additional mechanisms for the court to use said
"we've exhausted them," and "are continually working on patching
things up." Although a senior circuit judge pointed out that the
court had some "fine administrative judges" working on the prob-
lem, another judge pointed to a large pile of slip opinions on his
desk-opinions he had yet to read-to indicate the nature of the
problem.
The comment by one circuit judge that "because I don't think
there is a great problem, I'm not concerned," indicates that not all
feel that inconsistency is a high-priority item for the court-a neces-
sary prerequisite to solving the problem. Moreover, there is some
feeling that the court's inability to make the problem of inconsis-
tency go away is not necessarily bad. As stated by one circuit judge,
"The great strength of a collegial court is that views are not homo-
genized." While many lawyers seek consistency as a means of
achieving "equality before the law" and to gain guidance in provid-
ing advice to clients, we also need to recognize that cases are seldom
"on all fours" with each other. Far more important, the courts in a
complex social system need to be able to decide cases not in a
straightjacket but with flexibility to adapt the law to changing de-
velopments.17
87. I am indebted to J. Woodford Howard for the comment which stimulated this
concluding thought. See note 68 supra.
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